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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.*
I. INTRODUCTION
One year ago we confidently declared that "[e]mployers need no longer
worry that the arbitration agreements they include in contracts of
employment will be subject to attack."' Now, however, the forecast is not so
certain. Following closely on the heels of its decision in Circuit City,2 the
Supreme Court, in EEOC v. Waffle House, has added a new wrinkle to the
employment contract arbitration clause issue-a wrinkle that does more to
return the debate to the murky world of uncertainty than it does to provide
predictability.3
In a 6-3 decision this spring, the Court ruled that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (hereinafter EEOC) is not barred from pursuing
relief on behalf of an employee even though the employee has signed an
arbitration agreement in conjunction with the employment contract. 4 With
this decision, the Court answered at least one "hotly disputed and
longstanding question" that remained in the wake of Circuit City-simply,
"whether employees may be compelled to arbitrate statutory employment
discrimination claims." 5 Now, employees are clearly not compelled to
arbitrate these claims, and employers once again may have reason to worry.
Whereas Circuit City was generally seen as a victory for employers
desiring binding arbitration of employment disputes, Waffle House can only
be viewed as a victory for plaintiffs.6 Now, after Waffle House, in addition to
* Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 754
(2002).
1 Charity S. Robl, Recent Development, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 17 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 219 (2001).
2 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
3 This uncertainty appears to propagate from the divide on the Court between the
traditionally conservative justices who favor uninhibited pursuit of arbitration clauses and
the liberal justices who favor restrictions on this course of action. See High Court
Appears Divided on Arbitration Matter, 12 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 298 (2001).
4 EEOC v. Waffle House, 122 S.Ct. 754 (2002).
5 See Mitchell F. Dolin, US. Arbitration Update, SG046 ALI-ABA 883, 886
(February 7-9, 2002).
6 See Erwin Chemerinsky, One Defeat, One Victory for Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 38
TRIAL, March, 2002 at 73. But See David L. Hudson, Jr., EEOC Can Override ADR:
Agency Isn't Bound by Arbitration Agreements, High Court Says, I No. 2 ABA J. E-
REPORT 3 (January 18, 2002) (arguing that the victory for employees may be limited, due
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worrying whether their arbitration agreements will be honored in disputes
with the EEOC, employers will also be concerned with the type of relief
available to its former employees-as the Supreme Court has held that the
EEOC is now able to pursue victim-specific relief under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Federal Arbitration Act.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Eric Baker went to work as a grill cook for Waffle House on August 10,
1994.7 In order to obtain this job, Baker signed the required application and
in doing so agreed to the included mandatory arbitration agreement.8 On day
sixteen of his employment, Baker suffered a seizure at his workplace and-was
"soon thereafter discharged." 9 Rather than seeking arbitration over his
termination, Baker filed a timely charge with the EEOC claiming that Waffle
House violated his civil rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(hereinafter ADA). 1o
The EEOC conducted an investigation and attempted to reach
conciliation with Waffle House, but was unsuccessful.11 The EEOC
subsequently filed suit in the Federal District Court for the District of South
Carolina.12 The claim was an enforcement action alleging that Waffle House
had violated the ADA by terminating Baker by reason of his disability. 13 The
EEOC sought as remedy injunctive relief and an order for specific relief
"designed to make Baker whole, including backpay, reinstatement, and
compensatory damages, and to award punitive damages for malicious and
reckless conduct."' 14
Finding that a "valid, enforceable arbitration agreement" existed between
Waffle House and Baker,1 5 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
to the basic fact that litigation does not produce the same likelihood of recovery-
however small-that arbitration provides.).
7 Waffle House, 122 S.Ct. at 758.
8 1d. All applicants for employment with Waffle House must sign a similar
application. Id.
9 Id.
O Id. At no time during the resolution of his claim did Baker attempt to initiate
arbitration.
" Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 759.
15 Id. This was in response to the district court's factual finding that Baker's
employment contract did not actually contain a mandatory arbitration clause-and its
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the effect that this agreement had in relation to the EEOC's complaint.
Though recognizing the EEOC's "independent statutory authority to bring
suit in any federal district court where venue is proper," the court of appeals
held that the EEOC was not able to pursue victim-specific relief that it sought
on behalf of Baker. 16 The court reasoned that "the federal policy [of the
Federal Arbitration Act] favoring enforcement of private arbitration
agreements outweighs the EEOC's right to proceed" when seeking "make-
whole" relief for a complaining party. 17 The court further stated that only
when the EEOC pursues "large-scale injunctive relief" will the "balance tip[]
in favor of EEOC enforcement efforts"-and then, only because "public
interest dominates the ... action."18
In short, the court of appeals held that "permitting the EEOC to
prosecute Baker's claim in court 'would significantly trample' the strong
federal policy favoring arbitration because Baker had agreed to submit his
claim to arbitration."' 9 The EEOC petitioned the Supreme Court and the
Court granted cert to determine this issue.
III. THE COURT'S HOLDING
Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that mandatory
arbitration agreements in employment contracts cannot preclude the EEOC
from pursuing relief on behalf of a complaining employee, even if that relief
is considered to be "victim-specific"--including such remedies as backpay,
reinstatement, and damages. 20
Rejecting the lower court's attempt "to balance the policy goals of the
FAA against the clear language of Title VII and the agreement," 21 the Court
limited the question to whether the arbitration agreement between Baker and
Waffle House limited the EEOC in its pursuit of remedies, 22 and based its
ruling upon a textual examination of the basic function of the EEOC and the
powers and limitations attributed to the agency by Congress through Title
VII and the FAA, respectively.
subsequent denial of Waffle House's motion under the Federal Arbitration Act to compel
arbitration. Id.
16 Id.
17 EEOC v. Waffle House, 193 F.3d 805, 812 (4th Cir. 1999).
181d.
19 Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. at 762 (quoting Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812).
20 Id. at 760.
21 Id. at 764.
2 2 Id. at 766.
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A. The Purpose and Powers of the EEOC Under Title VII
The Court began its analysis with an exploration of the powers of the
EEOC under Title VII and the subsequent amendments and case law that
followed the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Stevens
began this analysis by stating that "Congress has directed the EEOC to
exercise the same enforcement powers, remedies, and procedures that are set
forth in Title VII... when it is enforcing the ADA's prohibitions against
employment discrimination on the basis of disability. 2 3
Although'the EEOC was originally defined as "an investigative and
conciliation agency," 24 the Court explained that Congress's 1972
amendments 25 of Title VII "created a system in which the EEOC was
intended 'to bear the primary burden of litigation.' "26 As such, the EEOC
was then permitted to pursue in court remedies such as injunctions and
"appropriate affirmative action, which may include reinstatement, with or
without backpay." 27 Additionally, these amendments gave the EEOC
exclusive jurisdiction for one hundred and eighty days after a complaint is
filed to determine whether it will seek a civil cause of action.28 Although
these amendments did not address the issue of arbitration, they did establish
the basic framework from which the EEOC would operate for the next thirty
years.
From there, the Court addressed the case law development of this basic
framework and how this litigious power of the EEOC applies to the agency's
actions on behalf of complaining employees. In doing so, the Court
reestablished the independent authority of the EEOC to bring a cause of
action in court. First citing Occidental Life Insurance. Co. of California. v.
EEOC,29 the Court stated that under the 1972 amendments "the EEOC does
23 Id. at 759 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994)).
24 Rebecca K. Beerling, Comment, Left Out of the Balance-The Public's Need for
Protection Against Workplace Discrimination: Waffle House and Kidder Peabody
Attempt to Limit the Remedies Available to the EEOC by Balancing Policies Not in
Conflict, 25 HAMLINE L. REv. 295, 300 (2002).
25 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 1, 86 Stat. 103
(1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e (2000).
26 Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. at 760 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Northwest v. EEOC,
446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698 (1980)).
27 Id.
28 See Beerling, supra note 24, at'301. ("Even if the EEOC opts not to pursue the
complaint, the individual grievant may independently pursue a civil action[,J" or may be
provided with a 'right to sue' letter before the [one hundred and eighty day period] has
expired.").
29 Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
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not function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private
parties," 30 and explained that "[t]o hold otherwise would have undermined
the agency's independent statutory responsibility to investigate and conciliate
claims by subjecting the EEOC to inconsistent limitations periods." 31
The Court further explained that under General Telephone Co. of
Northwest v. EEOC32 the EEOC has the "authority to bring suit in its own
name for the purpose, among others, of securing relief for a group of
aggrieved individuals" and that the agency "is not merely a proxy for the
victims of discrimination." 33
Finally, the Court addressed the type of remedy that the EEOC is able to
pursue in court on behalf of a complaining party. The 1991 amendments to
Title V1134 permit "the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages by a
'complaining party."' 35 The Court explained that the term "complaining
party" is meant to "include both private plaintiffs and the EEOC," and that
"the amendments apply to ADA claims." 36 According to the Court, in the
context of Waffle House this "unambiguously authorize[d] the EEOC to
obtain the relief that it seeks in its complaint if it can prove its case against
respondent. '37
The only remaining question, therefore, was to what extent these
purposes and powers of the EEOC have been limited by the FAA.
B. Limitations Placed Upon the EEOC by the FAA?
1. The EEOC's Ability to Seek Relief
The Court began its discussion of the FAA by reasserting the policy in
favor of arbitration and declared that the purpose of the act "was to reverse
the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements... and to place
arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts. '38 Repeating
30 Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 432
U.S. at 355).
31 Id.
32 Gen. Tel. Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
33 Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Northwest, 446 U.S. at
324, 326).
34 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)).
35 Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. at 760 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994).
36 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(2), 1981a(d)(1), and 1981a(d)(2)).
3 7 1d.
38 Id. at 761 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24
(1991)).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
the rule from Circuit City, the Court then stated that "[e]mployment
contracts, except for those covering workers engaged in transportation, are
covered by the Act."39
Recognizing the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements," 40 the Court appeared ready to continue the pro-employer trend
of Circuit City. However, Justice Stevens continued by stating, "absent some
ambiguity in the agreement... it is the language of the contract that defines
the scope of disputes subject to arbitration." 41 According to the Court,
"nothing in the [FAA] authorizes a court to compel arbitration of any issues,
or by any parties, that are not already covered in the agreement. '42 And
though the FAA does guarantee that private arbitration agreements will be
enforced, because the EEOC-as a public agency-is not a party subject to
the arbitration agreement, the statute "does not purport to place any
restriction on [its] choice of judicial forum." 43 In essence, the FAA does not
apply to the EEOC in instances such as this-as the EEOC is simply not a
party to the case.
2. ReliefAvailable to the EEOC
Finding no limitation in the FAA upon the EEOC's ability to bring suit,
the Court likewise found no limitation in the type of relief that the EEOC
may seek. Further asserting this "'independent statutory authority"' of the
EEOC, the Court disagreed with the lower court's assessment that allowing
the agency to "prosecute Baker's claim in court 'would significantly trample'
the strong federal policy favoring arbitration." 44
Rather than distinguishing between appropriate "broad injunctive relief'
and inappropriate "victim-specific relief"-as the court of appeals opined-
the Supreme Court declared that the FAA "clearly makes the EEOC the
master of its own case and confers on the agency the authority to evaluate the
strength of the public interest at stake." 45 Therefore, regardless of the degree
public interest, the EEOC is the sole determiner of whether it shall proceed in
court and what remedies it shall seek; the courts have no ability to regulate
this decision.46
39 Id. (citing Circuit City 532 U.S. 105 at 112).
40 Id. at 762 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25) (citation omitted)).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. (quoting Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812).
45 Id. at 762-63.
46 See id.
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The Court disagreed with the dissent and with respondent's assertion that
the EEOC is limited under Title VII to "appropriate" relief as determined by
the courts-which specifically excludes victim-specific remedies such as
those sought by the agency on behalf of Baker.47 Once again, the Court
arrived at the conclusion that "[t]he text of the relevant statutes... do[es] not
authorize the courts to balance the competing policies of the ADA and the
FAA or to second-guess the agency's judgment concerning which of the
remedies authorized by law that it shall seek in any given case."
48
Rather, the Court found that the Title VII reference to "appropriate"
relief specifically 'efers to "a subcategory of claims for equitable relief, not
damages" and does not permit a court to broadly prohibit a certain form of
relief Simply because an employee "has signed an arbitration agreement. 49
The Court once again objected to the court of appeal's distinction of some
forms of remedy as being victim-specific and others as being simply
injunctive, or broadly-based. 50 Instead, the Court viewed all remedies
available to the EEOC as a means within the power of the agency to
"vindicate a public interest, not simply [to] provide make-whole relief for the
employee, even when it pursues entirely victim-specific relief."51 This
approach, the Court held, is more in keeping with the "detailed enforcement
scheme created by Congress." 52
C. The Dissent
The dissent-led by Justice Thomas-believed that the Court's opinion
"conflicts with both the [FAA], and the basic principle that the EEOC must
take a victim of discrimination as it finds him." 53 Because the majority
47 Id. The argument was based upon a reading of 2000e-5(g)(l), which states in part,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (2001).
48 Waffle House, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 766.
4 9 Id. at 763.
50 Id. at 764. According to the Court, this classification of certain remedies as
"victim-specific ... is both overinclusive and underinclusive." It is overinclusive because
"punitive damages ... serve an obvious public function," and "underinclusive because
injunctive relief, although seemingly not 'victim-specific,' can be seen as more closely
tied to the employees' injury than to any public interest." Id. at 764-65.
51 Id. at 765.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 766 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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opinion allows the EEOC to seek victim-specific relief for a complainant that
is unable to personally seek the same relief, the dissent felt that the Court
now allows the EEOC to "do 'on behalf of [the victim]' that which he cannot
do for himself."54
As with the majority, the dissent took a textual approach to Title VII and
arrived at the opposite conclusion that the determination of appropriate
remedies is reserved for "a court and not for the EEOC." 55 Additionally, the
dissent found the absence of clear, unambiguous language to be
determinative. Citing legislative history and Congress' prior efforts to grant
federal agencies the authority to pursue and enforce particular remedies, the
dissenting justices concluded that the legislature-knowing how to grant this
"cease-and-desist" power-specifically chose not to do so with the EEOC. 56
Instead, the dissent declared, "[t]he statutory scheme enacted by
Congress... entitles neither the EEOC nor an employee, upon filing a
lawsuit, to obtain a particular remedy by establishing that an employer
discriminated in violation of the law."57
The dissent further concluded that "it would [not] be 'appropriate' to
allow the EEOC to obtain victim-specific relief."58 Because the employee is
the "ultimate benefactor" of any suit that the EEOC brings, the dissent felt
that the agency should only be able to obtain the same relief that the
employee could get on his own. 59 And, in the context of employment-related
arbitration agreements, the dissent reasoned that this precludes the EEOC
from obtaining certain victim-specific relief that the employee has
specifically and voluntarily waived through the agreement to arbitrate.60
Finally, Justice Thomas argued that "allow[ing] the EEOC to obtain
victim-specific relief... would contravene the 'liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements' embodied in the FAA."'61 Citing principles
54 Id. at 768.
55 Id. The dissent found the plain language of § 2000e-5(g)(l) as expressly giving
the discretion of appropriate remedies to the court. Id.
56 Id. at 768-69 (According to the dissent, both the original House and Senate
versions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 would have granted the
EEOC these powers, as Congress had granted them to the National Labor Relations
Board.).
57 Id. at 769.
58 1d.
59 Id. at 769-70.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 772 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
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of res judicata and mootness,62 the dissent warned against interpreting
enforcement of the ADA "in a manner that undermines the FAA. 63
Essentially, the dissent feared that by ignoring the effect that the majority's
opinion could have on arbitration agreements, the Court would discourage
the use of arbitration agreements when Congress has expressly established a
policy that favors their use.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE COURT'S RULING
The question, then, is obvious: "Is the dissent correct?" Will this ruling
in fact discourage the use of arbitration agreements in employment contracts?
The answer, unfortunately, is not so readily evident. Certainly, when
comparing the interests of employers against those of employees, EEOC v.
Waffle House-as stated above-can only be seen as a victory for
employees. What remains to be determined is the size and scope of this
victory.
A. The Scope of this Decision
Once again, Waffle House facially appears to be a sharp break from the
recent Supreme Court trend, typified by Circuit City, that has supported
employer-mandated arbitration agreements. However, a careful examination
of the scope of this decision may lead to an alternative conclusion.
First, it is important to note that the decision in Waffle House addresses
only the EEOC's ability to seek victim-specific relief, and leaves to
62 See id. at 772-74. As to res judicata, the dissent cautions that an employer will
now "face the prospect of defending itself in two different forums against two different
parties seeking precisely the same relief," while their employees "will be allowed two
bites at the apple--one in arbitration and one in litigation conducted by the EEOC-and
will be able to benefit from the more favorable of the two rulings." Id. at 772-73. As for
mootness, the dissent explains in response to the majority:
It should go without saying that mootness principles apply to EEOC
claims. For instance, if the EEOC settles claims with an employer, the
Commission obviously cannot continue to pursue those same claims in court.
An employee's settlement agreement with an employer, however, does not
'moot' an action brought by the EEOC nor does it preclude the EEOC from
seeking broad-based relief. Rather, a settlement may only limit the EEOC's
ability to obtain victim-specific relief for the employee signing the settlement
agreement.
Id. at 773.
63 Id. at 774.
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speculation the ability of other agencies do the same.64 The Court's
assessment of this issue hinges in great detail upon the specific authority of
the EEOC under Title VII and the ADA. 65 As such, the Court's analysis does
not naturally extend to other federal or state enforcement agencies. 66
From this point, it may be better said that Waffle House is not so much a
victory for employees (or, subsequently, a defeat for employers) as it is a
victory simply for EEOC. What the Court's decision appears to have really
done is simply reinforce the powers of the EEOC and essentially grant the
EEOC an "oversight" position in the few cases each year that are similar to
Waffle House.67 This, in turn, may go a long way towards ensuring that
employment arbitration agreements are of the highest quality. 68 If the EEOC
issues arbitration guidelines, only those employers who choose non-
compliant arbitration methods will risk the results found in Waffle House.69
B. The Existing Limitations on the EEOC
Finally, from a purely practical standpoint, the effect of this decision is
limited severely by two important self-imposed restrictions on the EEOC.
First, as indicated by Justice Stevens in the majority's opinion, the EEOC is
not able to pursue relief in court unless it first seeks conciliation. 70 Only after
the EEOC satisfies this requirement can it seek victim-specific relief through
litigation.
Second, even after passing the conciliation gate, the claim has to survive
the EEOC's own selection process. Again, as the Court explained, the likely
result will not be litigation-as the EEOC actually litigates less than one
percent of the claims it receives each year.71
64 See Michael Delikat, Discrimination Law Update, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION & SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS 2002 49, 74 (noting that "the decision
does not directly affect enforcement efforts by the Department of Labor, the NLRB or
state agencies").
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See Garry Mathiason & George Wood, Arbitration in Employment Settings:
Implications of Circuit City and Waffle House, BENCH & B. MINN., Jul. 2002, at 21, 24.
68 See id (noting that now "the EEOC can bring important unresolved workplace
discrimination issues into the federal courts to establish new case precedents ... [which]
guarantees that courts will remain available to provide guidance on important public
policy issues").
69 See id.
70 See EEOC v. Waffle House, 122 S.Ct. 754, 762, n. 7 (2002) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (1994)).
71 See id. at 763, n.7.
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Though not itself an argument of legal principle (as the dissent
indicated 72), this factor cannot be ignored when determining the practical
effect of the Court's decision. Regardless of the potential negative effect that
Waffle House may have on employers, as a purely practical matter the
decision is not likely to create an environment where arbitration agreements
are discouraged.
V. CONCLUSION
The only clear result of the Court's decision in Waffle House is that the
EEOC is now able to pursue in court victim-specific relief for an employee
that has signed an arbitration agreement in conjunction with his employment.
This result, however, is limited. Waffle House does nothing to change the
insipient notion that arbitration agreements are favored in the employment
context.
Therefore, what appears to be a clear-cut victory for employers may in
fact simply be a clear-cut victory for arbitration agreements in general-
creating greater scrutiny over their creation and thereby potentially creating
better arbitration agreements.
Although this Waffle House wrinkle is an important wrinkle, at the end
of the day we may still confidently declare that employers have little cause to
worry that their employment arbitration agreements will be subject to attack.
Through the murk created by Waffle House, we may in fact see that the
Circuit City trend is little changed.
Barry A. Naum
72 See id. at 775, n.14.
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